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Abstract:
Product-line length, or variety, is a key competitive tool used by retailers to differentiate
themselves from rivals.  Theoretical models of price and variety competition suggest that both
store and product heterogeneity are key determinants of price and variety strategies, but none test
this hypothesis in a rigorous way.  This study provides the first empirical evidence on
supermarket retailers’ combined price and variety strategies using a nested CES modeling
framework.  Unlike other discrete-choice models of product differentiation, the NCES model is
sufficiently general to admit both corner and interior solutions in both store and product choice. 
The model is estimated using store-level scanner data for all grocery chains in a major West
Coast market and finds that retailers do indeed use both price and product-line strategies to
compete for market share, but tend to follow moderately cooperative pricing strategies and price
and more cooperative strategies in variety.  
Key words: game theory, nested CES, price competition, retailing, variety.
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Price and Product-Line Rivalry Among Supermarket Retailers
Introduction
Many believe that retailers operate in what are often described as “local monopolies” (Slade;
Besanko, Gupta and Jain; Dhar).  However, there is an increasing amount of evidence that this is
not strictly true (Chintagunta; Chintagunta, Dube and Singh; Richards and Patterson 2003, 2004). 
Indeed, a cursory analysis of the recent financial performance of U.S. supermarket chains
suggests that exactly the opposite is more likely – that groceries are sold in something nearly
approximating perfect competition.  While it may be the case that shoppers tend to compare
prices among brands within the store rather than between stores (Slade) and often make their
store-selection decision on the basis of location, cleanliness, service or variety (Walters and
McKenzie), managers are nonetheless responsible for the price-competitiveness of their store and
often set prices for individual products on the basis of rival prices (McLaughlin).  Nonetheless,
retailers have long realized that by differentiating themselves horizontally they are able to obtain
some measure of market power.  As with other types of firms, retailers may use various forms of
non-price competition to differentiate themselves from others.
Of these non-price tools, this paper focuses on the use of product-line, or variety,
strategies among supermarket retailers.  Retailers typically offer a number of products in order to
differentiate themselves either vertically or horizontally.  While vertical differentiation (offering
hamburger and filet mignon, for example) represents a means by which retailers price
discriminate to extract more surplus, horizontal differentiation (offering five different types of
lettuce) is a way in which retailers can attract a larger number of customers, build market share
 The authors address a specific example, but do not formally test the hypotheses that follow from their1
model.  
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and gain market power through the “portfolio effect” (Nevo).  Among theoretical models of
variety competition, Dixit and Stiglitz and Spence were among the first to develop formal models
of equilibrium product proliferation, showing that firms face a fundamental tradeoff between the
cost of developing additional products versus the benefits of greater market share and pricing
power with longer product lines.  More recently, Raubitschek.uses the constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) model of Dixit and Stiglitz to show that the number of products offered by a
given firm in equilibrium will be lower, the fewer firms in the industry.  Recognizing that
differentiation often results in the selection of only one store or product, Anderson and de Palma
develop a model of price and variety competition in which consumers select among stores, and
then products within stores, according to a nested-logit framework.  In equilibrium, they argue,
greater heterogeneity among stores leads to less variety, while heterogeneity among products
within each store leads to greater variety.  While conveniently parameterizing store and product
heterogeneity with the extreme-value scale parameters, it is well understood that the nested logit
model, while more general than a simple logit, implies unrealistic substitution patterns among
products within each nest.  Further, it implies that only corner solutions exist at each choice
level.  de Palma et al. apply this approach to explain spatial competition among video store
owners in which firms choose price and variety, but the authors do not formally test the theory.  1
Watson, on the other hand, endogenizes location choice and formally tests a variety and price
game, finding that variety is a concave function of the number of local competitors.  Strategic
product proliferation is important in a non-spatial sense as well.  Brander and Eaton develop a
-3-
model of strategic preemption in which producers of substitutable products are likely to
monopolize a particular market segment in order to prevent a rival from entering.  Hamilton
synthesizes two branches of the modeling literature by combining a discrete store-choice model
with a CES model of product choice to show that variety is the key strategic variable among
oligopolistic retailers, while pricing decisions reflect product heterogeneity only.  While
Hamilton agrees with Anderson and de Palma on the effect of product heterogeneity on variety,
he shows that greater store differentiation, in fact, leads to more variety, not less.  This study
provides an empirical test of the implications of Hamilton’s hypothesis. 
Despite the extensive theoretical research on product proliferation, there has been
comparatively few empirical tests.  Previous empirical research concerning the competitive
aspects of product variety is nearly all directed at the level of the manufacturer, where a “product
line” may consist of only a small set of related brands and competitors are very few (Bayus and
Putsis; Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta, 1996, 1999; Dobson and Kalish; Oren, Smith and
Wilson).  Roberts and Samuelson design and estimate a repeated two-period non-cooperative
oligopoly model among U.S. cigarette manufacturers in which “number of brands” is a key
determinant of demand, but not a strategic variable.  In this research, models of product-line
competition are typically specified at the level of the individual brand and product-level conduct
parameters are estimated while the proliferation decision itself is treated as either exogenous
(Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta (KVC) 1996, 1999) or without any basis in a structural
model of competition (Bayus and Putsis).  Nonetheless, KVC show that yogurt makers are able
to gain a measure of market power through the “portfolio effect” of offering a greater array of
products, effectively reducing the elasticity of demand for their whole product line.  Draganska
 Studies by Choi and more recently, Sudhir, formally model the nature of manufacturer-retailer interactions2
but assume a highly simplified retail market. 
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and Jain, on the other hand, recognize the strategic importance of product-line length in
estimating a model in which the number of flavors offered per product line and the price of the
product line are endogenous to retail demand.  Further, they follow Berry, Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes, and Nevo (2000, 2001) in specifying a logit demand model in which product
differentiation is reflected in discrete consumer choices.  Although the decision to introduce new
products is presumably to attract new customers by providing a better match to their preferred set
of characteristics, none of these studies explicitly considers the effect of product differentiation
on the nature of competition in a market.  
This study presents an empirical framework this is designed to test the nature of price and
variety competition among multi-product retailers using a structural game-theoretic approach. 
Unlike previous models where retailers compete only in prices, we argue that retailers likely
compete in the number of products offered as well, or the variety of selection.  We test this
hypothesis in a nested framework in which consumer demand at both a store and product level
follow from a single, representative utility maximization problem and in which the endogeneity
of price and variety strategies is explicitly accounted for.  Our data represent two years of weekly
sales of several different items within the fresh fruit category.  Unlike other studies, we believe
that using unbranded commodity data is necessary to test retail behavior because consumer
packaged good sales are driven largely by manufacturer incentives and category management
programs.  Fresh produce, therefore, represents the only means of testing retailer strategies in an
independent, uncontaminated way.   With these data, our primary contribution consists of an2
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empirical test of whether grocery retailers compete in prices, variety, both prices and variety or
neither.  Further, if they do compete in either of these tools, we can also shed light on the precise
nature of the game that is being played. 
Empirical Model of Variety Competition
The primary implication of Hamilton’s model is that, although retailers choose both variety and
price, pricing decisions reflect only product heterogeneity and acquisition cost and not the
intensity of competition among stores.  On the other hand, the number of different products
offered by a store – variety – depends not only on product differentiation, but differences among
stores as well.  In order to test the core hypothesis of this research, we develop an econometric
model that includes structural equations for: (1) equilibrium prices, (2) equilibrium variety
(number of products per store), and (3) the market share of each store.  Rivalry in either price or
variety will, in turn, be largely determined by the degree of differentiation between stores, the
extent of product differentiation, differences in marginal cost (wholesale price), and differences
in  fixed retailing costs.  Both the degree of product differentiation and store differentiation are,
however, unobserved to the econometrician.  Therefore, the econometric procedure estimates
both product and store differentiation as unknown parameters.
In the majority of cases, this is due to the fact that the extent of differentiation is
unobserved to the econometrician, or is a latent variable influencing both competition and
demand.  Berry; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes; Ackerberg and Rysman, and Nevo (2000, 2001),
among others, explicitly account for unobserved product differentiation within a discrete choice
framework.  By estimating structural supply and demand models with consumer utility a function
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of both observed and unobserved product characteristics, these studies are able to identify the
extent of differentiation in imperfectly competitive markets.  This approach, however, focuses on
differentiation inherent in the product itself – or that created by manufacturers – and necessarily
assumes away any further differentiation created by other channel members.  Dhar and Cotterill,
on the other hand, argue that products purchased in retail supermarkets are differentiated in two
dimensions: (1) from other products in the same store according to their embodied attributes, and
(2) from similar products in other stores on the basis of store characteristics.  This implies that a
two-stage model of store and product choice is required to estimate the degree of substitutability
both among stores and among products within stores.  
There are several ways to represent the two-stage choice process, depending on whether
each stage is regarded as discrete (one alternative is chosen) or continuous (several can be
chosen).  Many argue that real-world choices are more usually discrete than continuous. Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980) describe the general conditions under which well-defined preferences will
generate discrete choices.  Namely, if the utility function is of the general form:
i where R  is an index of quality, increasing in the vector of attributes x,
then consumers will choose the commodity for which the quality-adjusted price is the lowest. 
Hanemann (1984) develops an econometric framework based on this logic that integrates the
discrete choice among brands and the continuous choice of quantity in one maximum utility
problem.  Based on the indirect utility functions he defines, Vaage (2000) describes an
application to Norwegian appliance and power demand, while Chiang (1991), Chintagunta
(1993), Richards (1998) and van Oest, Paap, and Franses (2003) consider discrete choices among
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brands and continuous quantity purchases.  Although this approach has a definite advantage in
theoretical consistency, it has a number of limitations in empirical application, however.  First,
substitution among brands is driven entirely by their market share and not by fundamental
attributes of the choice itself (Nevo).  Second, the price-response parameter in the brand-choice
model is constrained to -1.0 so estimates of brand-choice elasticity are necessarily unrealistic. 
Third, this approach makes the somewhat unrealistic assumption (true of all random utility
models) that consumers do indeed make a discrete choice among brands.  For most products that
consist of multiple flavors or sizes, purchases are more typically described as “multiple-discrete”
where observed demand consists of a mixture of interior and corner solutions.
A logical and intuitive alternative to the discrete / continuous approach followed by the
studies above is a nested logit similar to Anderson and de Palma or de Palma et al.  However,
retail grocery shoppers do indeed make a discrete choice among stores, but the subsequent choice
among products, and the quantities of each, are more logically considered to be continuous. 
While many authors model similar problems using a nested logit approach, there are many
practical problems with this approach in studying retail demand for quality-differentiated foods. 
First, consumers typically buy many different types of product from within a single category on
each shopping trip.  Such multiple discreteness as described above is not appropriate for a
nested-logit framework.  Second, while a nested logit model offers more general substitution
relationships than a simple logit model, it nonetheless imposes unrealistic restrictions on
substitution between products in separate branches of the model.  Third, nested logit models
imply linear utility in price and other product attributes – hardly a realistic or theoretically sound
description of utility.  Consequently, we adopt a different approach here that offers both a more
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general treatment of substitutability among products, while retaining the nested-decision logic
inherent in shoppers’ decisions between quality differentiated stores and products within stores. 
A number of recent studies consider more general forms of the discrete / continuous
problem addressed by Hanemann.  Hendel (1999) develops an explanation based on the
heterogeneity of needs among computer users within a large corporation.  Building on this basic
framework, Dube (2004) uses the logic that “multiple discreteness” likely reflects the fact that
purchase and consumption are not the same event.  Rather, consumers buy goods in anticipation
that their taste may vary from one consumption event to another between shopping trips. For
example, within the fruit category, a consumer may anticipate consuming a banana for breakfast,
an apple for lunch and perhaps strawberries with dinner.  Moreover, there are typically several
individuals involved in each consumption event, with the shopper anticipates not only a
preference for variety over different events, but also tastes that vary among individuals.  Kim,
Allenby and Rossi (2002), on the other hand, specify a translated, additive utility function that
relies on quality-adjusted prices to drive discrete outcomes in a manner similar to Hanemann. 
Unlike Hanemann, however, their approach allows for declining marginal utility and the
possibility of some interior utility maximization solutions.  However, the models developed by
Kim, Allenby and Rossi and Dube are more appropriate for household-level data where true
corner solutions are observed.
For the aggregate, store-level data used here, we adopt a more general model that allows
for both corner solutions and continuous substitution at both a store and product-level – the
nested CES (NCES).  Perhaps not surprising given the nature of the available data, research into
the demand for recreational visits (ie., fishing, skiing, camping, etc.) has developed a number of
 Brown and Heien call their NCES model the S-branch utility tree.  This specification was, however, later3
criticized by Blackorby, Boyce and Russell (1978) because it implies preferences are affine homothetic.  They reject
this attribute of the S-branch model by specifying a more general Gorman Polar Form model that nests the S-branch
as a special case. 
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useful ways of approaching the discrete / continuous demand problem.  Building on the NCES
model of Sato (1967) as applied to demand analysis by Brown and Heien (1972), Morey et al.
(2001) build a model of fishing-trip demand that allows for general substitution relationships
among alternatives, is parsimonious in parameter space, allows for complementarity, has the
potential to be flexible and, finally, appears to perform well in empirical application.   Although3
they develop models based on both expenditure-share and trip-occasion share, for retail food
demand, clearly expenditure share is the appropriate specification.  von Haefen and Phaneuf
(2003) subsequently reestimate the NCES of Morey et al. using a Possion, rather than a
multinomial distribution for trips over time.  In the case of retail grocery stores, however, we are
not interested in individual household’s allocation of trips over time.
Focusing on the choice among grocery stores on a single shopping occasion basis, we
assume that a household maximizes utility from the current occasion only.  Further, we assume
that the consumer first chooses among the products she wishes to buy, and then decides from
which store she wants to purchase the entire bundle, based on considerations of both cost and
inherent quality of the store.  Using a two-level NCES specification, the indirect utility function
for this problem is written: 
(1)
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(2)
iwhere F  is the elasticity of substitution among j products in store i, and F is the elasticity of
substitution among j stores (and the outside option) in a given market.  Analogous to the nested
ilogit model of price and variety competition of Anderson and de Palma, in this case F  represents
the degree of heterogeneity among products within a given store (intrastore heterogeneity) and F
represents the degree of heterogeneity among stores (interstore heterogeneity).  As they discuss,
and clarify in a footnote, for retailers who sell many highly substitutable products with little
iheterogeneity (a seller of submarine sandwiches, for example) F  is likely to be high relative to F. 
However, for retail formats that sell products meeting many different and diverse needs, the
critical node of competition is likely to be between stores rather than within each store. 
Supermarkets fall logically within this second category.  Given this key parameter, Anderson and
de Palma argue that formats with a high degree of intrastore heterogeneity are likely to be
characterized by few stores offering many different products, while a high degree of interstore
heterogeneity is more conducive to many stores with limited offerings.  Although our model to
this point is not able to comment on the number of stores, we will be able to test their hypotheses
regarding the number of products offered within each store.  Further, note that prices are adjusted
for the inherent “quality” of each product and store in a manner similar to that suggested by
Deaton and Muellbauer and Hanemann, namely by multiplying observed prices by a strictly
positive function:    
ij ijwhere (  is an idiosyncratic preference parameter, z  is a binary variable indicating whether or
ijnot the product was on a promotion during the week, zp  is an interaction term between the
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ipromotion dummy and shelf price, N  is the number of products offered by store i, and m is a
vector of seasonal dummy variables.  Multiplying R by the price provides a quality adjusted price
iso that  for each j = 1, 2, 3, ... N  products per store and i = 1, 2, 3 ... N stores. 
kConcavity requires F  0 [0, 4) and, to allow for the possibility that the quantity of some products
is zero, F > 1.  Applying Roy’s Identity to (1) and simplifying provides the share equations for
each choice of store and product:
where  is the price-aggregator function, or price index, for store i.  In our
application of the NCES to store and product choice, we include an “outside option” along with
the four included retail stores to allow for the fact that shoppers can buy fresh fruit from places
other than the major retail chains described by our data.  Consequently, share expansion can
indeed represent category growth for any and all of the stores we consider here.  An estimable
1ijform of (3) is created by expressing each share in logs and adding an iid error term, : : 
for i = 1, 2, ... 4 and j = 1, 2, ... 5.  However, modeling the demand side is not sufficient to
(3)
(4)
  Dhar, et al. extend the general notation for the first-order conditions of a profit maximizing multi-product4
firm presented by Nevo (2001) by demonstrating that the estimation of conduct parameters requires only elasticities
from the demand system, along with measures of cost and other supply shifters as required.  
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understand how these stores interact in price and variety space. 
Rather, we follow the structural industrial organization literature by formally modeling
the supply side of the retail sector as well.  Prices and variety in the NCES retail model are
clearly endogenous.  Even if neither are strategic variables for retailers, which they may indeed
be, they are likely to be endogenous for the more subtle reasons cited by Villas-Boas.  Both
prices and the number of product-types offered for sale are set by retail managers who are able to
observe many factors that can influence store-level demand, but are not observable to the
researcher.  Display alignment, in-store specials, supplier concerns and many other
considerations are taken into account in making marketing decisions that may not be observable
to an outside analyst and are most certainly not independent from price and variety outcomes.   In
order to model strategic interaction among retailers in prices and variety and to address these
more subtle price-endogeneity issues, the demand system is estimated simultaneously with the
first order conditions for retail profit maximization (Bresnahan 1989; Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes 1995; Besanko, Gupta and Jain 1998; Nevo 2001, among many others).  In this way, we
also estimate both price and variety-response elasticities for each retail chain in our sample data. 
Although the first order conditions for the NCES system are highly non-linear, we follow Dhar,
et al. in deriving general first order conditions in terms of elasticities only.   Draganska and Jain4
also derive the supply side for firms that choose both price and product-line length in a similar,
general notation, but assume Bertrand-Nash behavior with respect to both variables.  We do,
however, follow a similar approach in estimating behavior at the store, rather than the individual
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product level.  Focusing on store-level strategies has both logical and practical appeal.  First,
retail store managers do not compare prices with rivals’ on an individual product level, but rather
category by category (McLaughlin).  Second, variety is more meaningful on a store-level than
with respect to individual product lines, particularly in the fresh produce data used in this study. 
Third, estimating the entire four-store and five-product model would create an unreasonably high
number of parameters to estimate, particularly given that we include both price and variety
reactions.  Therefore, the profit equation for firm i is written as:
ijassuming non-jointness of production.  In (4), M is total market size, and c , the marginal cost of
retailing, is separable between wholesaling and a Generalized Leontief retail unit-cost function so
that total product costs are written:
ij kwhere m  is the wholesale (FOB) price of product j, v  is a vector of input prices that includes
4retail labor costs, marketing costs and FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate) costs and :  is an
iid random error term.  Firm profit also includes certain fixed costs of variety, which encompass
the costs of either developing and marketing private labels, or introducing and shelving external
brands.  Draganska and Jain argue that these costs are convex as greater variety imposes higher
costs on the firm.  To capture this effect, we model variety costs in terms of a simple quadratic
function:  which, of course, implies linear marginal costs of variety. 
(5)
(6)
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Unlike Draganska and Jain, however, we allow for price and variety behavior that is more
general than Bertrand-Nash by introducing conduct parameters, or conjectural elasticities, within
both prices and varieties.  Further, firms are assumed to form expectations of others’ reactions to
changes in both price and product line.  In other words, we estimate cross-tool conduct
parameters similar to Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta so that we may test for whether firms
respond to changes in price with changes in product line and vice versa.  In this way, we reflect
the nested logic of the NCES model in that each store’s prices and product lines are determined
by decisions made within other firms as well as for internal considerations.  Taking this into
account, the first-order condition with respect to the price index of retailer i becomes:
Similarly, the first order condition with respect to variety, or product-line length for retailer i is
given by:
i iwhere P  and C  are retail and wholesale CES price indices, respectively, and the terms 
represent firm i’s expectation of firm k’s response to changes in its
storewide “average” price and the variety of products on offer.  These equations can be
simplified by writing each in terms of demand and response elasticities, and measures of total
(7)
(8)
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i icategory cost (e ) and revenue (r ), producing an estimable system of price: 
and variety equations:
ik ikwhere ,  is the price elasticity of demand of product i with respect to the price of product k, 0  is
the “variety elasticity” of demand of product i with respect to the number of k products offered,
ik ikN  is the conjectural elasticity of firm k’s price with respect to a change in firm i’s price, 8  is
ikthe conjectural elasticity of firm k’s product-line length with respect to firm i’s price, "  is the
ikelasticity of firm k’s variety response to an increase in offerings by firm i, while (  is the
2i 3iconjectural elasticity of firm k’s price with respect to a change in firm i variety and : , and :
are econometric error terms.  As a result, the entire system consists of three blocks of equations,
with 20 equations in the demand block (four stores of five products each) and 4 equations in each
of the price and variety response blocks.  While estimation of the entire system together would be
preferable, the size of this problem requires that each be estimated sequentially, while imposing
the cross-equation restrictions implied by the previous stage. All of these estimates are obtained,
therefore, by FIML within each independent block of equations.
Data and Estimation Methods
In order to provide a sample that is both of sufficient detail and depth to study the above
(9)
(10)
-16-
problems yet is tractable in an econometric sense, the data for the proposed study consist of retail
scanner data across multiple products within a single grocery category for all supermarket
retailers located in a single retail market.  We use data from the fresh fruit category because retail
sales of unbranded commodities represent the only opportunity to study retail competition that is
not driven by manufacturer promotion programs, category management, or obligations created
under slotting or pay-to-stay fee agreements.  Store-specific data are required to identify
competitive interactions among stores, while product-specific data provide the measure of
heterogeneity among products within each store.  Further, because individual stores are subject to
significant individual variation, we aggregate all stores in a given chain to represent a common,
representative “store.” At the product-level, the data consist of price, quantity and total
expenditures on a weekly basis from January 1998 through December 1999, for a total of 104
weekly observations.  Because there are a number of unique items per product definition,
depending upon whether it is bagged or bulk, small or large, or a particular variety, we aggregate
over individual price-look-up (PLU) codes to the product-level for red delicious apples, granny
smith apples, fuji apples, bananas, and grapes.  Our measure of variety consists of a simple PLU
count for each aggregate product.  All data were obtained from FreshLook Marketing, Inc. (FLM)
of Chicago, IL.  
Los Angeles represents an ideal case-study because there are a small number of retailers
who dominate the retail market, each retailer follows a HI-LO as opposed to an EDLP strategy
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports wholesale product price data for major regional
centers, so our wholesale price series is likely to represent true purchase costs.  Issues of variety,
price and store-differentiation are best studied with single-category data due to the variety of
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factors consumers regard as important in choosing a store (Arnold, Oum and Tigert; Supermarket
News), the potential for heterogeneous price and product strategies across categories in a given
store, and the necessity of pooling data over cross-sectional and time-series observations. 
Obtaining product SKU (stock-keeping unit) counts by product is important because different
stores may emphasize one product over another.  While one store may stock many different
varieties of apple, for example, the same store may limit the number of available brands of peach
in order to emphasize its higher margin offerings.  Moreover, if the analysis were to consider
other categories such as beverage, cereals or ice cream, the number of SKUs is often influenced
by considerations such as manufacturer incentives, slotting fees, or promotional allowances
(Chintagunta 2002).  To identify a pure strategic variety choice, therefore, this analysis requires
data from a single, important category for each chain.    
Data for the other variables are from various secondary sources.  Wholesale prices for the
sample of fruits represented here are from the Economic Research Service of USDA (grapes), the
Washington Growers’ Clearing House (apples), or the Ecuador Minister of Agriculture (bananas)
and represent shipping-point FOB prices.  Retailing costs are measured by indices of wages in
retail and wholesale trade, business services, advertising, finance, insurance and real estate
(FIRE), transportation and utilities as well as a food store employment cost index, and an index
of hourly wages among food store workers, all from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
In order to capture retail competition at the store-level, all prices represent per-product,
per-store averages and all quantities are expressed on a per-store basis. Therefore, each grocery
chain is essentially regarded as one firm with multiple locations.  Store characteristics include the
number of stores in the LA metro region.  Further, the “outside option” is calculated in a manner
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similar to Nevo (2001).  Specifically, LA residents are assumed to consume each fresh fruit at the
national average rate.  US per capital fruit consumption values are then multiplied by the
population of LA county (the market area of the sample stores) to obtain a total market
consumption value for each fruit.  The outside option is then the difference between total LA
consumption and that represented by the sample stores.  Any error can be due to differences
between LA and national consumption rates, or to fruit purchased outside of the retail channel
represented here.  If these errors are random, then the parameter estimates remain valid.
Although estimating equations (4), (9) and (10) together is preferred on efficiency
grounds, the size of the estimation problem required sequential estimation of the demand and
supply blocks.  Elasticity estimates from the system of equations described by (4), therefore, are
included in equations (9) and (10) in order to recover the conjectural elasticity estimates.  In both
systems, however, prices and variety are clearly endogenous, so an instrumental variable
procedure is used for each block of equations.  For the demand system, the set of instruments
includes the set of wholesale fresh fruit prices, the supermarket cost indices described above and
lagged values of each product’s retail price and market share.  Because of the large number of
parameters in the demand system, however, this set of instruments is still not sufficient to obtain
unique estimates of each.  Consequently, we follow Draganska and Jain and interact these
dummies with a set of product and store binary indicator variables.  These instruments are also
used to estimate the supply block.  Both sets of equations are estimated using full information
maximum likelihood.    
Results and Discussion 
1 2 3 The test statistic for the null hypothesis that F  = 1.0 is 303.689, for F  = 1.0 is 147.053, for F  = 1.0 is5
4219.775, and for F  = 1.0 is 119.046.  In each case, the test statistic is chi-square distributed with one degree of
freedom. 
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Although tests of the price and variety response hypotheses are conducted using the supply-side
results, there is also considerable interest in the validity of the CES demand system and the
insights it provides.  If the elasticity of substitution among stores is equal to 1.0, then there is no
need to consider a nested system as all stores are regarded as perfect substitutes.  Similarly at the
product level, an elasticity of substitution of 1.0 implies that all products are perfect substitutes. 
Based on the results in table 1, a Wald chi-square statistic for the hypothesis that F = 1.0 is 17.50,
while the critical value at one degree of freedom at a 5% level is 3.84.  Therefore, we clearly
reject the null hypothesis, which suggests that a two-level nested system is preferred.  Among the
iproduct-level elasticities of substitution, we again reject the null hypothesis that F  = 1.0 in each
case so different types of fruit are indeed imperfect substitutes for one another.   In fact,5
Anderson and de Palma raise the issue of whether we should expect greater differentiation (less
substitutability) within a particular store or among different stores.  In the supermarket example,
consumers choose many types of goods to fill fundamentally differing needs, but each store sells
roughly similar types of products.  Therefore, we expect greater differentiation within each store
than across stores.  The results in table 1 support this expectation as the product-level
substitution elasticities are significantly lower than the store-level estimate.  Interpreted as
measures of heterogeneity, these estimates also mean that the degree of product-level
heterogeneity is far greater than the level of heterogeneity among stores.  Although four point-
estimates of the product-level substitution elasticities do not permit a formal test of the
hypothesis that greater product-heterogeneity leads to more variety, or longer product-lines, the
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estimates in table 1 provide some evidence contrary to this idea.  Whereas store 1 has a
substitution elasticity of 0.040 and offers only 52.6 products on average, store 4 offers 77.33
products and has a substitution elasticity among products of 0.202 – the highest of all our sample
stores.  Anderson’s argument maintains that if products are not readily substitutable for one
another, a firm can introduce more brands without fear of cannibalizing existing sales.  However,
this must be weighed against the fact that retailers can span the characteristics space preferred by
customers with fewer, more distinct products.  In this case, the latter effect dominates.
The remaining parameters in the demand system comprise the product-level quality
ijfunctions, R .  Whereas Morey et al. assume common quality parameters among each of their
primary-level choices, this alternative was rejected in the LA retail data in favor of product- and
store-specific parameters.  In each case, a positive parameter estimate suggests that the perceived
“quality” or underlying demand for the product rises in the associated variable or, in the case of
the intercept term, the inherent preference for the good in question is higher than average.  In this
respect, the results in table 1 indicate that consumers in three of the four stores express a
preference for red delicious apples, while consumers in all stores tend to favor fuji apples. 
Perhaps surprising given the importance of bananas to fresh produce retailing, consumers in three
of four stores tend to show a negative preference for bananas.  Retailers are perhaps more
interested, however, in the effectiveness of price-promotion programs among fresh fruit.  For
virtually all products and stores, the promotion variable represents a strongly significant
influence on demand.  A positive value for the binary sales indicator means that demand
increases during a sale, while a negative interaction term means that demand also becomes less
elastic.  Both of these outcomes are desirable from the retailer’s point of view.  
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[table 1 in here]
While it is not the primary objective of this paper, it would be possible to calculate the
ik4profit implications of a sale in each case with the CES demand estimates.  Finally, the $
parameter shows the effect on the demand for product k in store i of increasing the number of
variants in a particular product line.  Consumers may value a variety of choices in fresh fruit if
they are easily satiated in either the taste or nutritional attributes they desire when consuming
fruit (McAlister and Pesemier; Chintagunta 1998), they seek a hedge against future changes in
taste (Walsh) or desire more attributes than one item can provide (Farquhar and Rao).  Product
variants in this case may mean different sizes of apple, package forms, or different colors of
grape, for example.  Although Draganska and Jain provide arguments, and show empirical
support, for a concave effect of variety on market share, here we maintain a linear relationship to
keep the model as parsimonious as possible.  In general, the results tend to be broadly positive,
particularly in the case of fresh grapes, where many would argue that variety not only appeals to
consumers’ nutritional needs for diversity, but is also visually appealing as well.  These results
are similar to Draganska and Jain or Bayus and Putsis in personal computers.   
While it is a relatively simple matter to calculate price elasticities for individual products,
because the focus of this paper is on store-level strategies, table 2 presents estimates of “fresh
fruit” price elasticities for each store.  Consistent with common notions of the competitiveness of
the supermarket sector, the price elasticity of demand for each store is near unity, except for the
fourth.  As expected, the stores are substitutes for each other and, in general, strong substitutes
both in an economic and statistical sense.  With respect to variety elasticities, all of the own-
elasticities are positive and significant, while the cross-elasticities are negative and significant. 
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These elasticities provide some potentially valuable information. For example, the fact that the
second and fourth stores both face price-inelastic demand, and relatively high variety elasticities
suggests that these stores may benefit from higher prices and longer product lines among their
fresh fruit.  However, greater insight into the strategic value of these changes is provided by the
supply-side estimates of each firm’s price and variety response.
[table 2 in here]
These estimates are shown in table 3.  As in Vilcassim, Kadiyali and Chintagunta, each
structural equation allows for firm-specific “multiple interactions” or expected price and variety
responses by rivals to a change in variety, or to a change in price.  Given that these responses are
derived in a Nash equilibrium framework, all are assumed to be optimal given the choices made
by other firms.  By assuming general Nash behavior on the part of all stores, we offer a more
comprehensive analysis of product-line decisions than Draganska and Jain, who assume
Bertrand-Nash (zero conduct parameters) in both prices and variety.  With respect to price
behavior, the conjectural elasticity estimates presented in the top panel show how rivals are
anticipated to react to changes in the price of store i.  If the estimate is greater than zero, rival
firms are expected to raise their prices in response to a rise in firm i’s price in a cooperative way.  
ikClearly, the results in table 3 indicate that the retailers are far from competitive (N  = 0).  Rather,
the estimates in each case suggest a range from mildly cooperative (firm 2 with respect to firm 4)
to strongly cooperative (firm 2 with respect to firm 3).  These results also suggest that price and
variety are strategic complements as each firm expects its rivals to increase the number of
products they offer in response to an increase in the firm’s own price.  When one firm raises its
price, others’ market shares will rise, thereby leaving them more consumer surplus to extract
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either directly through higher prices, or through a combination of even higher prices and longer
product lines.  Allowing for non-zero conjectural elasticities in this way provides perhaps greater
insight into the variety choice problem than Anderson and de Palma as it recognizes that pricing
decisions among rival firms also depend on product line decisions, and vice versa.  Based on the
pricing-equation estimates, therefore, retail supermarkets appear to behave cooperatively in their
pricing decisions, both in response to rival price and product-line choices.  
[table 3 in here]
On the other hand, the bottom panel shows that variety decisions are less uniform with
ikrespect to their implications for retailer strategy.  First, the (  parameters show the conjectural
elasticity of firm k’s variety with respect to that offered by firm i.  A positive elasticity, therefore,
suggests that product lines are strategic complements – if one firm lengthens its product line, it
will be able to raise its price, thus leaving more of the market for the other firms.  As in the case
of a simple price increase described above, with more market share the other firm can raise its
ikprice to extract more surplus (as suggested by the positive "  elasticities in table 3), or may either
shrink their product lines to reduce cost, or lengthen them to build more pricing power.  In table
3, firm 1 apparently makes product line decisions on the expectation that firm 2 will not follow,
as is the case for firm two with respect to firms 1 and 4.  Each firm, however, expects firm 3 to
capitulate in any product line expansion (or contraction) in a relatively vigorous way.  With
respect to the expected price-response of rivals to changes in variety, firms 1 and 2 expect very
strong cooperation in nearly all cases, but firms 3 and 4 expect firm 2 to counter any changes
they may make.  This lack of uniformity may be due to the fact that changes in product line are
not generally as transparent as prices.  Supermarkets tend not to advertise many of the minor
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products they offer, but typically publish as many prices as possible on a weekly basis. 
Nonetheless, we can make a general conclusion that retailers, on average, tend to cooperate in
both price and product-line decisions.
 Further, because price elasticities in the CES model depend upon the elasticity of
substitution among products, the results in table 3 can also be interpreted as indirect tests of the
store-heterogeneity hypothesis outlined in the introduction.  In the lower block of results shown
ikin table 3, a positive conjectural elasticity estimate (" ) suggests that firm i will offer more
products for sale the higher the cross-price elasticity of demand, or the less heterogeneous it
perceives the market to be.  Unlike the product-heterogeneity case, this finding is consistent with
the theoretical predictions of both Hamilton and Anderson and de Palma.  Anderson and de
Palma explain this result in the following, indirect way: greater store-heterogeneity, holding the
number of firms fixed, allows each to raise its price, thus inducing entry and the range of
products offered per store to fall.  In our model, however, the effect is much more direct. 
Specifically, if stores are largely seen as homogeneous, then each will seek to differentiate
themselves by offering a greater range of products.  If doing so causes other stores to raise their
prices in response to the overall increase in demand, then they each have further incentive to
offer more variety.  Clearly, this process is limited by the rising cost of variety (note the
convexity of each of the variety cost functions in table 3), but can perhaps explain in part the rise
of supercenters and other “big box” retailers in markets such as children’s toys, consumer
electronics and books. 
 
Conclusions and Implications
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This study provides some empirical evidence on the strategic interaction of pricing and product-
line decisions by supermarket retailers.  Theoretical models of price and variety competition
suggest that interfirm heterogeneity reduces variety, or the length of a firm’s product line, while
intrafirm heterogeneity increases equilibrium variety.  While other studies investigate this
question using restrictive, nested-logit based models, this is the first to empirical test the variety /
heterogeneity relationship using a flexible, nested CES model.  
The data used in this study consists of two years of weekly scanner data for four major
retail chains in the Los Angeles market.  We use data from an unbranded, fresh product category
in order to minimize the influence of manufacturer interference in retail sales decisions and to
gain access to accurate and relevant wholesale price data.   These data are used to estimate a fully
structural system of fresh fruit demand and first-order conditions with respect to store-level
prices and product numbers.  With this approach, the estimated conjectural elasticities represent
retailers’ response to store heterogeneity in price and variety strategies.
Estimates of the demand system provide a number of interesting results.  First, we find a
lower elasticity of substitution among products within each store than among stores, as expected
given the similarity of product offerings among supermarkets.  Second, we find considerable
support for research among consumer product goods retailing (Chintagunta 2002) that finds price
promotion to be highly effective in increasing product-level market share.  Third, variety does
indeed have a strongly positive impact on sales volume in a particular product line.  Fourth, we
find that sales at the store level are nearly approximately unit elastic with respect to price, and
uniformly positively related to store-level measures of variety.  
Using the demand system estimates, we then estimate price and variety response
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equations that allow for that allow for multiple strategic interactions between rival store’s price
and variety decisions.  Of primary interest among these estimates, we find that each store tends to
follow a “cooperative” or complementary variety strategy with respect to certain of its rivals, but
not all.  Following different variety strategies with respect to some rivals is likely driven by
perceived proximities in other respects, such as location, price levels or private label strategies.
Further, we use these estimates to test Anderson and de Palma’s hypothesis that greater store-
level heterogeneity is likely to lead to a smaller assortment of products offered per firm.  We find
support for this hypothesis, but not for their corollary that greater product-level heterogeneity
leads to longer product lines.  Moreover, the mechanism driving our result is fundamentally
different as ours is strategic in nature while theirs derives from the type of equilibrium assumed.  
While this research provides many implications for what we know about competitive
interactions among supermarket retailers, perhaps the most important concerns the consequences
for how the supermarket industry is likely to evolve.  Driven by factors outside their immediate
market niche, namely competition from other store formats, traditional supermarkets of the type
we study here have been reducing retail prices in real terms in a number of categories. 
Consequently, if they follow cooperative pricing strategies, each will undercut the other until
something nearly competitive arises.  At the same time, however, variety is expected to respond
in the same direction, leading to smaller product assortments and shorter product lines.  In fact,
this is precisely what is occurring now.  Through “efficient assortment” and category
management programs, supermarkets are reducing SKU counts throughout the store in order to
save inventory and handling costs as well as to allow the introduction of their own store brands.  
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Table 1. Nested CES Parameter Estimates: Los Angeles Retail Fresh Fruit, 1998-1999
Store 1 Store 2 Store 3 Store 4
Coeff. Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
iF 0.040* 12.642 0.176* 31.381 0.123* 30.802 0.202* 29.866
i11$ 6.199* 6.060 3.620* 3.193 -0.948 -0.945 3.668* 3.593
i12$ 1.074 1.091 8.705* 8.910 9.082* 10.037 16.652* 17.320
i13$ 5.963* 5.922 -11.433* -10.464 -6.524* -6.397 -17.874* -15.761
i14$ 0.096 0.367 0.298* 3.438 0.255* 2.159 0.532* 5.876
i21$ -18.536* -14.376 -0.533 -0.507 -2.050 -1.675 0.269 0.209
i22$ -0.569 -0.592 9.526* 11.055 16.586* 13.850 4.580* 4.927
i23$ 2.351* 2.390 -10.341* -10.079 -16.326* -12.913 -4.375* -4.263
i24$ 0.209 0.842 0.298* 3.489 0.229 1.941 0.532* 5.602
i31$ 23.458* 16.186 6.678* 5.656 15.514* 12.002 10.814* 8.076
i32$ -0.807 -0.828 2.114* 1.985 0.926 1.042 5.891* 6.780
i33$ 4.151* 4.108 1.730 1.714 1.959* 2.002 -9.490* -9.016
i34$ 0.499 1.956 0.378* 4.272 0.285* 2.493 0.519* 5.365
i41$ -2.297* -2.030 7.908* 7.397 -7.616* -6.571 -4.535* -3.662
i42$ 10.730* 10.377 22.073* 15.463 17.275* 15.751 10.838* 11.076
i43$ -4.073* -4.048 -23.600* -16.468 -9.853* -10.052 -9.316* -9.627
i44$ -0.353 -1.253 0.109 1.120 0.272* 2.339 0.557* 6.306
i51$ 1.541 1.538 -4.797* -4.247 -2.413* -2.332 11.474* 8.376
i52$ 15.491* 12.844 2.623* 2.572 3.772* 3.468 5.451* 5.855
i53$ -5.175* -5.885 -0.985 -1.524 -1.535* -2.643 -2.470* -4.789
i54$ 0.962* 4.081 0.512* 5.235 0.368* 2.882 0.571* 5.663
F 0.870* 117.400
LLF -468.571
P2 1,1214.79*
iN 52.606 73.663 70.529 77.328
ijk     In this table, parameter $  refers to the demand-parameter estimate for store i, product j, variable k, where j = 1a
is red delicious apples, j = 2 is granny smith apples, j = 3 is fuji apples, j = 4 is bananas, j = 5 is grapes,  k = 1 is the
product-store specific preference parameter, k = 2 is the direct promotion effect, k = 3 is the price*promotion
iinteraction effect, and k = 4 is the variety effect.  N  is the average number of products offered per store over the
isample period.  A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level.  The F  are elasticities of substitution among
products within store i, while F is the elasticity of substitution among stores.  Seasonal indicator variables are
suppressed to conserve space, but are all significantly different from zero.  The P  test statistic compares the2
estimated model to the “null model” with constant terms only.  At 5% and 141 degrees of freedom, the critical chi-
square value is 169.711.   
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Table 2. Store Price and Variety Elasticities
Elasticity of: 
With 
respect to:a
1 2 3 4Q Q Q Q
1k 2k 3k 4k, t-ratio , t-ratio , t-ratio , t-ratio
1P -1.151 -106.326 0.146 13.485 0.146 13.485 0.224 8.157
2P 0.321 6.632 -0.976 -20.157 0.321 6.632 0.353 8.631
3P 0.207 10.098 0.207 10.098 -1.090 -53.037 0.176 8.244
4P 0.624 8.657 0.623 8.631 0.623 8.644 -0.674 -9.527
1k 2k 3k0 t-ratio 0 t-ratio 0 t-ratio 4k0 t-ratio
1N 0.179 6.795 -0.022 -6.089 -0.022 -6.089 -0.022 -6.089
2N -0.022 -5.437 0.685 10.905 -0.226 -5.437 -0.226 -5.437
3N -0.071 -4.990 -0.071 -4.990 0.369 7.617 -0.071 -4.990
4N -0.032 -5.711 -0.129 -5.711 -0.063 -5.711 0.675 9.791
i i      In this table, all subscripts refer to store i, so Q  is the volume of sales from store i, P  is the price index for storea
ii, and N  is the number of products offered for sale by store i.  All elasticities are calculated at sample means.  A
single asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level.   
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Table 3. LA Supermarket Price and Variety Response Elasticities, 1998-1999
 
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
i1N 1.000 N.A. 0.403 17.777 0.455 13.463 0.232 45.481
i2N 0.458 22.897 1.000 N.A. 0.158 7.914 0.136 33.371
i3N 0.565 24.189 0.678 27.730 1.000 N.A. 0.127 29.757
i4N 0.326 22.351 0.072 4.388 0.239 13.671 1.000 N.A.
i18 1.000 N.A. 0.126 50.124 1.210 24.750 0.211 39.071
i28 0.425 17.735 1.000 N.A. 0.186 5.802 0.221 39.146
i38 0.149 45.385 0.683 30.627 1.000 N.A. 0.053 1.297
i48 0.134 11.933 0.030 2.240 0.139 11.526 1.000 N.A.
i1J 0.104 2.092 1.969 20.031 0.608 22.929 0.458 15.886
i3J -0.407 -7.878 1.347 26.163 0.824 18.652 -0.102 -3.221
i13J 0.010 2.668 0.424 9.867 0.142 14.031 0.081 7.315
i1* -2.826 -20.570 -1.540 -8.332 0.077 2.395 2.428 81.428
i2* 0.371 26.105 0.859 16.218 10.999 299.700 10.909 280.460
i1( 1.000 N.A. -0.149 -1.856 0.082 8.854 0.052 4.717
i2( -0.210 -3.798 1.000 N.A. -0.058 -7.545 -0.043 -6.719
i3( 0.412 77.248 1.118 14.912 1.000 N.A. 0.017 2.476
i4( 0.160 2.866 -0.566 -7.456 -0.001 -0.538 1.000 N.A.
i1" 1.000 N.A. 1.155 15.887 0.013 0.730 0.015 1.071
i2" 0.146 25.191 1.000 N.A. -0.035 -3.065 -0.018 -2.016
i3" 1.058 148.070 1.306 17.642 1.000 N.A. 0.009 0.991
i4" 0.380 8.288 -0.309 -5.647 0.002 -0.151 1.000 N.A.
LLF 4,094.223
ik ik      In this table, N  is the conjectural elasticity of firm k’s price with respect to price changes by firm i, 8  is thea
ikconjectural elasticity of firm k’s variety with respect to price changes by firm i, "  is the conjectural elasticity of firm
ikk’s variety with respect to the number of products offered by firm i,  (  is the conjectural elasticity of firm k’s price
il imwith respect to the number of products offered by firm ii, and J  and *  are parameters of the retailing and variety
cost functions, respectively.  A single asterisk indicates significance at   
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